In Time of Troubles: Challenges and Prospects in the Middle East and North Africa by Drine, Imed
   
 
THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Time of Troubles: Challenges and 
Prospects in the Middle East  
and North Africa 
 
 
 
 
By: Imed Drine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 981 
April 2010 
1In Time of Troubles: Challenges and 
Prospects in the Middle East  
and North Africa 
 
Imed Drine* 
UN-WIDER 
Helsinki, Finland 
 
      
Abstract 
The recent crises concerning food and finances highlight the extreme fragility of the MENA 
countries and question the sustainability of the development processes. The social stress and 
economic instability caused by these challenges give a good indication of what might be 
expected in the future. This paper intends to provide a comprehensive analysis for 
understanding the major challenges faced by the region and the kind of internal impediments 
that will need to be dealt with in order to achieve a higher level of economic development and 
more resilience to external shocks.  
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21. Introduction 
Throughout its history, the Middle East and North African region (MENA) has managed 
to maintain a unique geopolitical significance. Its central location at the junction of three 
continents and its control over main commercial networks had helped to establish the region as 
the world’s leading economic power throughout the 7th-13th centuries. 
The region remained relatively cohesive until the 18th century while economic power shifted to 
northern Europe during the 14th -16th centuries. Europe started surging ahead in the 18th 
century in the aftermath of the industrial revolution and technological advancement. With the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in late 19th century, most of the region was colonized by 
Europe powers.  By mid 20th century the independent countries of the region had formed a new 
architecture, ushering in a new era.  
Despite the fact that the MENA region no longer has a leadership role, it still holds a unique 
position. Because of its central location straddling Europe, Africa and Asia as well as its 
cultural links with more than 1.5 billion people scattered over the world, the Middle East and 
North Africa area, more than any other region, is still the focus of world attention.  
Its high profile may also be explained by the key role the region plays in the global economy. 
Indeed, two key additional factors have become apparent during the modern period, which 
ensure that the region remains the world premier geopolitical flashpoint. These include the fact 
that the world’s major reserves of oil are located here, in addition to its important financial 
resources. Moreover, many experts believe that in the next decades the MENA region will be 
among the most important areas where renewable energy, including solar energy, will be 
exploited. 
The MENA states have shown serious concern over their economic development since 
independence. During the 1970s, supported by its natural resources, post-colonial development 
programmes were implemented to improve the quality of life for the citizenry. Most MENA 
countries invested in major infrastructure projects, as well as in education and public health. 
However, as the oil boom started to decline around the end of the 1970s, economic performance 
gradually weakened, and poverty increased dramatically throughout the region.  
The high growth rates in some MENA countries have created the impression of sustainable 
development, but this is misleading. Many factors indicate that the development process applied 
3since the 1970s, has failed to deliver its promise. Despite massive investments in infrastructure, 
in schools and in health, the MENA region in general still suffers from major shortcomings and 
from development results that are far below expectations.  
As a consequence of the excessive reliance on raw material exports for foreign exchange 
earnings and on foreign markets as a source of industrial products and food items, the region is 
essentially faced with three challenges: growth volatility, distorted production structure and a 
mismatch between key economic activities, high unemployment levels, especially among young 
people, and food security risk. Weak governance and corruption, which have handicapped 
human and institutional progress in the region, are additional development bottlenecks. 
The recent crises concerning food and finances highlight the extreme fragility of the MENA 
countries and question the sustainability of the development processes. The economic and 
social impacts of these crises on the economies of the MENA region signal the magnitude of 
the challenges facing the region and the need to reorient its development policies. The social 
stress and economic instability caused by these challenges give a good indication of what might 
be expected in the future. 
This paper intends to provide a comprehensive analysis for understanding the major challenges 
faced by the region and the kind of internal impediments that will need to be dealt with in order 
to achieve a higher level of economic development and more resilience to external shocks.  
The first section of the paper provides a general overview of the Middle East and North Africa. 
In the second section we try to analyse the reasons for, and the main manifestation of, its 
vulnerability. The third section concludes and offers the main policy recommendations.  
2. Overview of the region  
Deepak Nayyar (2009) states that the past can be a pointer for the future and that in order to 
understand the present better, we need to learn from history. In this section we examine the 
hypothesis that the recent poor performance of the MENA region is a matter of (bad) choices, 
not its irrevocable destiny.  
42.1  MENA region from historical perspective  
While MENA countries differ in terms of resource endowments and economic evolution, they 
share common history and cultural heritage. The MENA region has managed to maintain a 
unique geopolitical significance throughout its history. Situated at the junction point of three 
continents, the region was a thriving centre of trade. Control over main commercial networks 
helped to establish MENA as the world's leading economic power from the 7th to the 13th 
centuries. Compared to the rest of the world, including Europe, the region was very prosperous: 
according to  Table 1, GDP per capita in the MENA region in the 10th century was the highest 
of the five country-groups.  
Table1 
GDP per capita from the first century to the 19th 
(1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars) 
Year  1 1000 1500 1600 1820 
 Latin American 400 400 416 438 636 
 Asia 433 447 554 557 604 
 Africa  472 425 414 422 420 
 Western Europe 576 427 772 889 1,202 
MENA 517 527 485 453 532 
                                  Source: Maddison (2003) 
MENA’s explorers and traders created a prosperous global economy through a commercial 
network that stretched from the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and 
China Sea. Its cities were integrated with no restrictions on the free flow of people, ideas, 
techniques, goods, and capital (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007).  As Lombard (1975) notes, the 
region at that time could be perceived of as a series of urban islands, linked by trade routes with 
the supply of precious metals lubricating the movement of goods and factors of production 
along these circuits.  
5Figure1 
 Commercial trade routes during 7th-13th centuries 
 
An early form of market economy flourished between the 8th and 12th century, due mainly to 
the development of trade. A monetary system based on a strong, stable and high valued 
currency (the dinar) was created in the 7th century to facilitate the exchange of goods and 
production factors (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007). Innovative new business techniques and 
forms of business management adapted from different civilizations were promoted during this 
period by economists, merchants and traders. Scientific advances in many fields such as 
hygiene, sanitation and medicine resulted in a significant increase in urbanization. According to 
Lombard (1975: 118) ‘This prodigious urban expansion was characterized at first by the 
creation of towns, some of which rapidly became the largest in the world’.  
A modern system of irrigation, based on the knowledge of complex hydraulic and hydrostatic 
principles, was introduced early in the 9th century,† providing the foundation for the region’s 
agricultural revolution (Watson, 1983). The agricultural revolution was based on four key 
principles: the development of a sophisticated irrigation system, adoption of a scientific 
approach to improve agricultural techniques, incentives based on a new approach to land 
ownership that recognized the private property and the introduction of new crops that 
transformed private farms into enterprises supporting the export industry.  
Findlay and O’Rourke (2007) argues that industry and mining were also highly developed. In 
the Nile valley, for example, flax was the cornerstone of the flourishing linen industry. Major 
                                                 
† Crops from Africa such as sorghum, from China (citrus fruits), and numerous crops from India (mangos, rice, cotton and sugar 
cane), were distributed throughout the region, which previously had not grown these crops (Watson, 1974). 
6capital-intensive industries, using very advanced technology such as in sugar refining and 
papermaking, were developed in cities like Andalusia (Ashtor, 1992). The fusion of a variety of 
cultures and knowledge from many civilizations and the integration of diverse economies 
during the region’s ‘golden age’ gave birth to the earliest forms of capitalism that were adopted 
and further advanced in medieval Europe from the 13th century onwards (Labib, 1969; Banaji, 
2007).  
The Middle East and North Africa remained relatively powerful until the 18th century despite 
the shift of economic power to northern Europe at the beginning of the 14th century. Erosion of 
its central position began in the early 14th century. No single explanation for this decline exists, 
but most historians confirm that the loss of control over global trade and the emergence of 
Europe as the new global power are the main causes. In addition to external factors, intense 
internal dissensions, weak central government, declining financial resources were also among 
the causes that led to the fragmentation of the region and its decline thereafter. By the end of 
the 19th century most countries in the region were colonized, and during colonialism, the 
economic development processes became distorted to serve the requirements of the dominant 
foreign powers. Any local production of commodities which might have competed with the 
products of the dominant country was forcefully prevented (Alnasrawi, 1987). The evolution of 
the MENA economies was determined by the needs of the colonial country and its economic 
system.  
By the mid-20th century, the independent countries formed the region’s new architecture and a 
new era began. 
 
It is clear that the economic performance of the region during past centuries was not simply a 
coincidence but the result of good management of existing capacities combined with the 
willingness to seize opportunities offered by the favourable global environment. 
Although the MENA region no longer has a leadership role, it still maintains a unique position. 
Because of its central location between Europe, Africa, and Asia and the fact that the locality 
has the largest heritage relationship of all global regions, with more than one billion people over 
the world, implies that MENA is still the focus of attention.  
 Its high profile may also be explained by the key role the region plays in the global economy. 
Indeed, two additional key factors have become apparent during the modern period, which have 
ensured the region’s position as the premier geopolitical flashpoint of the globe: the world’s 
7major oil reserves are located here, and its financial resources are considerable. Moreover, 
many experts have recently stated that the MENA region during the next decades will be among 
the vital areas where renewable energy, including solar energy, will be exploited. 
 
2.2 Modern period of MENA region  
After independence, the MENA states had serious concerns for a national industry that would 
be geared more to their own specific interests as well as to the development of the education 
and health systems. Financed through natural resources during the 1970s, post-colonial 
development programmes were implemented to improve the quality of life for citizenry. Most 
MENA countries invested in major infrastructure projects, education and public health. With 
the end of oil boom in the 1970s, however, economic performance gradually declined and 
poverty increased dramatically throughout the region.  
Since the late 1980s, many countries have launched important economic reforms in  line with 
programmes prescribed by such international institutions as International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank. These reforms essentially were concerned with privatization and trade 
liberalization, considered to be the tool to improve trading capacities and to attract more foreign 
direct investment. 
The development programmes, implemented in the late 1980s, have succeeded partially to 
improve economic growth and to adapt the economies of the region to the international 
environment. Nevertheless, although governments followed the main recommendations of the 
international institutions, these have been unable to deliver on their promise to their citizens, or 
to address the substantial deficiencies their economies face. In addition, most countries failed to 
implement any realistic political reforms to ensure the effective participation of various social 
stakeholders in the discussion and the implementation of economic reforms.  
The current MENA region encompasses 24 independent countries: Algeria, Bahrain, the 
Comoros, Egypt, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, 
Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and Yemen.  
Total surface area is 14.8 million km2, making it 44 per cent larger than China, or 3.8 times the 
size of the European Union. The MENA countries cover 9 per cent of the world's total surface 
8area and hold 61 per cent of the world’s known reserves of oil and 21 per cent of its natural gas. 
Eight out of the 10 oil-exporting OPEC countries are located in the MENA region (Algeria,  
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates), and in 2004 accounted for 
42 per cent of total oil exports in the world. 
The population of the MENA region was 325 million in 2008 (World Bank, 2008), indicating 
that the region is relatively scarcely populated, with a mere 38 inhabitants per km2. The most 
important reason for the low population density is the scarcity of water resources. 
The region covers a diverse group of countries, including some very rich and some very poor. It 
can be divided into three main country-groups, with different economic structures ‡:  
Table 2 
 Basic indicators for the three groups (2000-07) 
 Group 1 
Group 
2 Group 3 
Openness 98.53 79.83 75.23 
Unemployment rate 6.68 11.38 21.56 
Current account balance (% of GDP) 16.59 -2.36 -6.48 
GDP/cap ($ US) 14048.34 2252.26 617.10 
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 9.32 15.27 5.18 
Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) 85.11 21.47  
Total reserves in months of imports 9.77 7.23 4.83 
Manufactures exports (% of merchandise 
exports) 6.34 52.37  
Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (%) 18.68 14.86 22.72 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector 
(% of GDP) 41.90 94.16 10.10 
        Source: World Development Indicators, 2008 
 
First are the oil-producing countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, 
Libya, and Algeria) where oil contributes 36 per cent of total value added, 82 per cent of the 
export revenues and 71 per cent of government fiscal receipts, highlighting that these 
                                                 
‡ Table A1 in the appendix shows the main characteristics by country for the three groups.  
9economies are still overwhelmingly dependent on petroleum. While the value added of the 
petroleum industry represents 36 per cent of the region’s aggregate GDP, its contribution to 
employment, including all petroleum-related activities, is less than 5 per cent. These countries 
lack a domestic market to meet their needs in terms of consumer and non-consumer goods and 
have a paucity of financial and capital markets to absorb domestic savings.  
The second group is represented by the states that have more diversified but relatively 
vulnerable economies (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia). Indeed, these 
countries are deeply integrated into the global economy and rely on imports both for 
consumption and investment. Furthermore, exportation, foreign direct investment, remittances 
and tourism play a key role in the economic growth and job creation of these countries.  
The third group includes the poor countries (Sudan, Yemen, Mauritania, Djibouti, Somalia, and 
Comoros). This group is affected by serious economic and social problems as a result of 
inadequate economic and social structures. 
Rich cultural heritage, unique geopolitical position, and abundant natural resources, namely oil 
and natural gas, contrast with the region’s low performances in terms of productivity, 
democratic progress, and human development. Indeed, despite the unprecedented expansion of 
the hydrocarbon sector in recent years, income levels are low in most MENA countries; 
performance in the agricultural sector is poor and high rates of unemployment are 
commonplace. Moreover, the region suffers from serious economic and social instabilities and 
at least five countries (Iraq, Palestine, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen) are torn by violent internal 
conflicts§.  
Many reasons may explain the poor performance of the region, but most experts agree that 
failure of these modern states to find appropriate strategies to adapt to the constantly changing 
international environment is the main cause.  
In what follows, we attempt to shed some light on the main manifestations and causes of 
economic vulnerability in the region.  
                                                 
§ The Mena region was plagued by political, military and social conflicts during the last several decades. Libya has suffered from 
the UN sanctions for 8 years (1992-1999), Algeria has suffered from civil conflict for 9 years (1991-2000), Lebanon has suffered 
from 16-years civil war and 10 –years of external military aggression and Iraq has suffered from 8-years war and 9 years of UN 
sanctions.  
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3. Main manifestations and causes of vulnerability in MENA region 
The region’s economy, with almost 300 million people, is equal to half that of Italy and less 
than that of Brazil. The region’s total manufactures exports represent a mere 40 per cent of the 
exports of Netherlands and the region’s total non-oil exports are lower than those of Finland.  
High growth rates in some MENA countries have created the impression of sustainable 
development, but this is a misconception. Many facts indicate that the development process in 
the region has achieved its limit, as it has been unable to deliver what was promised. Despite 
massive investments in infrastructure, in education and in health, the MENA region in general 
suffers from major shortcomings, and outcomes that far below expectations.  
3.1 Main manifestations of vulnerability 
As many international reports have pointed out, the locality tends to be more economically 
vulnerable, as indicated by manifestations such as considerable GDP fluctuations, distorted 
economic structure, high unemployment levels and food security risk. 
Low growth and high growth volatility  
It is noteworthy that no other region in developing world has so much access to domestic 
financial resources as MENA region. Despite this advantage, economic growth has been highly 
disappointing. (The Arab World Competitiveness Report 2002-2003, part 1). 
MENA GDP growth rates have lagged behind other regions and, after Sub-Saharan Africa, it 
has the lowest total GDP, rising from $199.79 billion in 1975 to $561.78 billion in 2004, as 
compared to East Asia and Pacific where GDP rose from $256.17 billion to $2,132 billion 
during the same period. GDP per capita rose from $1,406 in 1975 to $1,977 in 2004, while for 
the same period, in East Asia and Pacific, it rose from $204 to $1,140, i.e. an increase of 558 
per cent compared to only 35 per cent in the MENA region.  
Moreover, World Bank data show that productivity in the MENA region (percentage change in 
GDP by employed individuals) fell 5.66 per cent in 2000, while East Asia and South Asia 
recorded an increase of 1.88 and 4.10 per cent, respectively. According to the Arab Knowledge 
Report (2009), growth performance in the MENA region was very poor in view of the fact that 
investments valued approximately $4000 billion in fixed capital formation and more than 
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$1,000 billion in human resources have been made during the last two decades. Clearly, much 
of the capital has been diverted to inefficient uses.  
Table3 
 GDP growth rate in MENA region and East Asia & Pacific (percent) 
 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 
MENA 7.31 -0.19 4.07 6.71 2.99 3.57 5.23 5.09 
East Asia & Pacific 13.16 7.14 7.48 5.75 9.59 7.29 8.18 8.48 
                             Source: World Development indicators, 2008 
Growth performance of the MENA states over the period 1975-2004 has been characterized by 
a higher volatility than in East Asia, caused mainly by the region’s overwhelmingly dependence 
on petroleum. The relative higher growth rates in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s were 
largely attributed to a favourable external environment. This situation became reversed in the 
early 1990s after the oil crash.  
 
Figure 2 
 GDP per capita growth in MENA and other regions (per cent) 
 
                       Source: World Development indicators, 2008 
The weak economic performance is also reflected in the higher volatility of GDP per capita, 
which grew by 4.41 per cent in 1975, -3.15 per cent in 1980, 0.87 per cent in 1985, 3.15 per 
cent in 1990, 0.9 per cent in 1995 and 3.34 per cent in 2004.  
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The higher volatility of GDP growth confirms that MENA region as a whole lacks of effective 
engines of growth despite that necessary conditions for development, such as infrastructure, are 
satisfied.  
Moreover, in the nine countries that represent about 73 per cent of the total population in the 
region, the average daily per capita GDP at current prices is less than five dollars, while the 
average income of 22 per cent of the population is about one dollar a day. According to UNDP 
(2009)** an estimated 65 million people in the region live in poverty, which means that about 
40 per cent of the population in countries included in the sample exist below the poverty line. 
Furthermore, it has been estimated that approximately 28 million (11 per cent) lack access to 
improved drinking water and 78 million (25 per cent) have no access to improved sanitation.  
Distorted economic structure  
“Natural resources are not a growth engine on their own and had not proven to be catalyst for 
other sources of growth for the region as a whole….” (The Arab World Competitiveness Report 
2002-2003, part 1). 
In general, the region’s economies are oil-dominated and oil is the main source of revenue. 
Extractive industries represent the largest share of gross domestic product, about 38.8 per cent. 
Oil revenues represent approximately 60 per cent of total public revenues, but more than 90 per 
cent in some of the producing oil countries.  
The region is also characterized by low production diversification and suffers from an 
imbalance between the key economic sectors because of its total dependence on exports of 
crude oil, gas and other minerals for funding economic core activities. The region contributes 
3.8 per cent of the world exports, including oil and its derivatives, and 3.1 per cent of the global 
merchandise trade volume. 
Table 4 
 Production structures in MENA region and other regions  
 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
MENA 16 14 16 15 
East Asia & 
Pacific 32 28 20 13 
                                                 
** Extrapolation is based on a sample of countries representing 65 per cent of the region’s population.  
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Latin America  12 10 8 6 
South Asia 38 32 27 21 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 20 18 18 17 
          
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
MENA 45 38 33 35 
East Asia & 
Pacific 40 42 43 45 
Latin America  38 39 32 32 
South Asia 23 25 26 27 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 32 34 30 31 
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
MENA 8 10 11 10 
East Asia & 
Pacific 32 31 30 31 
Latin America  27 27 20 18 
South Asia 16 16 16 16 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 17 17 16 14 
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
MENA 40 48 52 51 
East Asia & 
Pacific 28 31 37 42 
Latin America  50 51 61 62 
South Asia 39 43 47 52 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 48 48 52 53 
                                                      Source: World Development indicators, 2008 
As is shown in table 4, MENA seems to be less industrialized in the new millennium than it 
was decades ago, with the contribution of agriculture to GDP in the 2000s is as it was in the 
1970s and the share of the manufacture sector to total GDP the lowest among all regions. The 
low contributions of agriculture and industry imply that the MENA nations are developing into 
services-based economies. However, considering the region’s low productivity performance, 
the types of services produced offer little to the advancement of local knowledge and may 
indicate greater economic fragility. Accordingly, a radical change in the region’s development 
process with a more diversified and flexible production base is more than urgent. 
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Table5 
 Expenditure on Research and Defense in MENA countries 
               Expenditure on research 
as  
                  percentage of 2006 
GDP 
Military expenditure as 
percentage of 2005 
GDP 
Algeria  2.9 
Bahrain  3.6 
Comoros   
Djibouti  4.2 
Egypt 0.20 2.8 
Jordan 0.34 5.3 
Kuwait 0.18 4.8 
Lebanon 0.20 4.5 
Libya 0.70 2 
Morocco 0.75 4.5 
Oman  11.9 
Qatar   
SA  8.2 
Sudan 0.30 2.3 
Syrian   5.1 
Tunisia 1.30 1.6 
UAE  2 
Yemen  7 
                       Source: UNDP (2009) 
In addition, the region experiences a wide knowledge deficiency as a result of low public 
investment in ‘research and development’ and the failure to promote human resource 
development and technology transfers. The 2009 United Nations Human Development Report 
points out that only 0.2 per cent of the MENA region's GDP is at present spent on scientific 
research, compared to Denmark, France, Switzerland and the United States where the 
corresponding figure is between 2 and 3.6 per cent. Furthermore, 38 per cent of total population 
of MENA are still illiterate. According to UNDP (2009) the annual expenditure on scientific 
research per capita in the region is less than $10 compared to a corresponding figure of $575 
and $1304 for Ireland and Finland, respectively. On the other hand, the MENA region spends 
more than 4.5 per cent of its GDP on defense. 
 Moreover, over the last two decades braindrain in the region has increased and millions of 
highly skilled people have immigrated to developed countries, causing a massive economic and 
social loss in addition to significant development opportunities being missed. According to 
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estimations by the Arab Labor Organization, losses have increased twentyfold, currently 
totaling 200 billion dollars versus 11 billion dollars in the 1970s. The region accounts for 31 per 
cent of the braindrain from developing to developed countries (contributing approximately 50 
per cent of the doctors, 23 per cent of the engineers and 5 per cent of the scientists who migrate 
from the third world). According to many experts, this critical situation is also explained by the 
region’s restrictions on freedom as well as its bureaucracy and corruption.  
High unemployment rates 
The unemployment rate in the region is about 14 per cent, among the highest in the world 
(UNDP)††. Compared to other global regions, the area exhibits the highest rates of labourforce 
increase over the last three decades (figure 2), making the fact that the unemployment rate for 
young age groups reaches 40 per cent a major concern.  
 
 
Figure3  
Labor force growth over 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s 
 
 
                                         Source: World Development indicators, 2008 
Unemployment essentially concerns the youth and is linked more to the problem of insertion 
into the labour market (World Bank, 2004). This situation is typical in countries where 
education and training systems are not adequately linked to the economic environment. Indeed, 
graduates, misinformed about the country’s working conditions and requirements, have 
educational profiles that are inconsistent with reality, a fact which makes their first attempt at 
labour market entry difficult.  
                                                 
†† Higher unemployment rates confirm that economies of the region are stagnating even if they seem to be basically stable. 
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The high level of unemployment is a challenge for the region’s economies and may be a 
potential source of social disruption and conflict, particularly as the population will increase to 
410-460 million by 2020. Those under the age of 14 years will constitute more than 40 per cent 
of the total population and the number of job seekers over the next decade will top 39 million. 
The situation deteriorates further if we include women´s growing participation in the 
workforce, which will put greater pressure on the labour market.  
The number of unemployed in the region is expected to increase to 25 million by 2010. The 
situation worsens when we acknowledge that nearly 5 million new workers hope to enter the 
labour market annually; the estimated funds needed to provide new jobs for this cohort  will 
exceed $20 billion annually. If the workforce in the region continues to grow at the same rate, it 
is estimated that the labourforce will reach 134 million by 2010 and 155 million by 2015. This 
means that the region should provide 39 million new jobs by 2010, to meet the additional needs 
for the 17 million job seekers and 22 million new labour-market entrants. By 2015, the need in 
the region is about 60 million jobs and by 2020 around 105 million jobs. In addition, according 
to the Arab Labor Organization (2009) a 1 per cent increase per annum in the annual 
unemployment rate induces a 2.5 per cent loss in total GDP (about $115 billion). 
The fact that the region’s countries lack unemployment insurance implies that the social 
impacts of being jobless are substantial. The problem is particularly severe for the informal 
sector workers, as these are not registered with the state's institutions, and consequently have no 
social protection. The problem is most acute in those MENA countries where the informal 
sector accounts for 90 per cent of economic activity, and is the largest employer of the labour 
market.  
In diversified economies such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, the informal sector is likely to 
expand, as it may be difficult to promote formal sector employment. The unemployment crisis 
can be aggravated by low capital flows, a sharp decline in exports, or a slowdown of investment 
growth in the developed countries. Finding new job opportunities in the MENA region during 
this decade is more pressing than at any other time in the past. The problem is the biggest in 
those countries where the risk of increased poverty is most eminent. 
Food security risk 
MENA is one of the most disadvantaged regions of the world with regard to food self-
sufficiency (figure 8). It is largely dependent on the import of grain, meat, milk, sugar and oils, 
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to meet the consumption needs of its population of 300 million. Food deficit is increasing and 
the reliance on external food sources has become a real constraint for most MENA countries. 
This will have a significant effect on their ability to achieve economic and social development 
in general and agricultural development in particular. 
Figure4 
The region is one of the most food-import dependent in the world  
 
 
For many MENA countries, more than 90 per cent of total food consumption is imported. In 
2007, the cereal trade balance recorded a deficit of 58.2 million tons, making the MENA region 
the largest importers of cereal in the world (FAO 2008).  
Table 6 
 Net cereal imports and food aid in MENA countries 
             (% total consumption) 98-00 
Algeria 76.10% 
Bahrain 39% 
Comoros  
Djibouti 100% 
Egypt 33.70% 
Jordan 97% 
Kuwait 99.60% 
Lebanon 88.40% 
Libya 89.20% 
Mauritania  
Morocco 54.10% 
Oman 98% 
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Qatar 95.60% 
Saudi A 72.90% 
Sudan 12.80% 
Syria  21.60% 
Tunisia 56.90% 
UAE 100% 
Yemen 76.30% 
Average 70% 
Source: FAO 2008, World Resources Institute. 
Food safety is a recurring problem that is related, in part, to the geographical characteristics of 
the region. Indeed, according to World Bank, MENA is one of the world’s most water-scarce 
regions. The region has a total area of about 14 million km2, of which more than 87 per cent is 
desert. It is characterized by a high dependency on climate-sensitive agriculture and a large share 
of its population and economic activities are located in flood-prone urban coastal zones. 
Furthermore, most people are city dwellers, not desert pastoralists.  
Figure5 
Distribution of major land uses for the MENA region 
 
                                  Source: FAO (2008) 
 
Moreover, the region annually exceeds its supply of water from rainfall and river flows, 
depleting groundwater resources. Accordingly, the availability of water and subsequent 
agriculture production are expected to diminish (UNDP, 2009).  Warren et al. (2006) confirm 
that by 2025, 80-100 million people in MENA will be exposed to water stress. By 2050 water 
availability per capita will fall by 50 per cent and there is high potential for food crises due to 
increasing demand (population) and declining supply factors (precipitation, yields). Indeed, the 
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growing competition for water is expected to reduce the share of agriculture to 50 per cent by 
2050.  
The degradation of agriculture is likely to increase unemployment in countries like Comoros, 
Djibouti, Mauritania, Sudan and Yemen where farm workers constitute 50 per cent of the total 
labourforce.  Gender inequalities are likely to increase because the share of women in the 
agriculture labourforce in many countries is relatively high (more than 60 per cent)‡‡.  
Table 7 
 Population growth and water availability in MENA countries  
 
 
Population 
1995 
(million) 
Water per 
capita 1995 
Population 
2025 
(million) 
Water per capita 
2025 
Algeria 28.1 527 47.3 313 
Bahrain 0.6 161 0.9 104 
Comoros 0.6 1667 1.3 760 
Egypt 62.1 936 95.8 607 
Jordan 5.4 318 11.9 144 
Kuwait 1.7 95 2.9 47 
Lebanon 3 1854 4.4 1261 
Libya 5.4 111 12.9 47 
Morocco 26.5 1131 39.9 751 
Oman 2.2 874 6.5 295 
Qatar 0.5 91 0.8 64 
Saudi 
Arabia 18.3 249 42.4 107 
Tunisia 9 434 13.5 288 
Emirates 2.2 902 3.3 604 
Yemen 15 346 39.6 131 
                      Source:  Gardner-Outlaw & Engelman (1997) 
 
According to World Bank projections for the region, temperatures will increase by 2 degrees C 
by 2030 (4 degrees C by 2050), so that the sea will rise 20-50 cm and rainfall precipitation will 
drop 20 to 40 per cent by 2050. Higher temperatures and diminishing precipitation will increase 
droughts. Indeed, Agoumi (2003) confirms that since the beginning of the 20th century, drought 
frequency in North Africa has increased from one event every ten years to five or six 
occurrences. He also adds that between 6 and 25 million people will be exposed to coastal 
flooding.  
                                                 
‡‡ See table A2 in appendix.  
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Increased water competition and low productivity have added to the region’s difficulties to feed 
its growing population. In addition to the harsh environment, the region needs to deal with 
inefficiency with regard to food crops and productivity  that results in particular from 
impractical farming methods, and weak training and education. Limited opportunities for 
financing and lending as well as misguided agricultural policies have resulted in declining farm 
output. On other hand, harsh living conditions in rural areas, due to the paucity of agricultural 
and rural development, has triggered massive rural–urban migration. 
Coping with the risk of food security will be beyond  the capacity of many of the region’s 
countries and is expected to add new challenges to the social agenda. Deteriorating living 
conditions of the poor are estimated to revive earlier social tensions and conflicts. It will, 
therefore, be necessary to introduce an integrated strategy that increases the options for 
controlling the demand on water resources and for encouraging their efficient usage.   
3.2 Determinants of economic vulnerability in the MENA region 
At least two factors can explain the apparent fragility of the region: high trade exposure 
associated with high export concentration, and social and political deficiencies.  
Heavy reliance on foreign markets  
All MENA economies, regardless of the level of their economic development, exhibit a 
common characteristic: excessive reliance on raw material exports for foreign exchange 
earnings, and on foreign markets for their industrial products and food items. 
Table 8 
Main characteristics of the MENA region (2000-07) 
  
East Asia 
& Pacific 
Latin 
America MENA 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
 
Workers' remittances 
(%GDP) 1.39 1.66 6.97 1.71 
 
Food import (% of 
merchandise imports) 4.97 7.23 16.84 11.36 
 
Fuel export(% of 
merchandise exports) 7.46 17.51 56.32 36.98 
 
International tourism, 
receipts (% of total exports 5.96 6.38 14.13 8.28 
 
Manufactures exports (% of 
merchandise exports) 79.1 55.35 24.47 31.85 
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 Openness 77.1 44.59 87.89 65.76 
 
Unemployment (% of total 
labour force) 4.55 9.19 14  
                           Source: World Development indicators, 2008 
Table 5 shows that, compared to other developing regions, the MENA region is more dependent 
on (i) remittances (accounting for almost 7 per cent of GDP), (ii) international tourism (14 per 
cent of GDP) and (iii) fuel exports (56 per cent of GDP). It also shows that the region is highly 
dependent on food imports, importing in general more than 50 per cent of agricultural products. 
The agricultural trade balance recorded a deficit of US$25 billion and a food deficit valued at 
US$18 billion in 2006.  
For most economies, the strong dependence on international markets has resulted in an 
underdevelopment of local markets. Indeed, it is widely recognized that the proportion of a 
country's population living in urban areas is highly correlated with the level of income. Urban 
areas offer economies of scale and richer market structures. Workers in urban areas are 
individually more productive, and earn more, than their rural counterparts. Consequently, 
increased urbanization would improve productivity and income per capita. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
                             
  
Source: Author’s calculation 
As is shown in table (6), MENA is the only region with a very low correlation between GNI per 
capita and urbanization, confirming the limited role of local markets in the region’s wealth 
creation§§.  
Consequently, economic development seems to be fostered not by indigenous economic forces 
and needs, but rather by the requirements of the industrial economies. The lack of dynamism in 
the local market and its insignificant contribution to economic development is certainly a major 
                                                 
§§ Morocco and Tunisia are the exceptions with correlation coefficients of 0.89 and 0.91, respectively. 
Table 9 
 Correlation between GNI per capita and  Urbanization 
in MENA region and other regions (1980-2004) 
 
MENA 0.37   
East Asia & Pacific 0.95   
Latin America  0.95   
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.93   
South Asia 0.95   
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weakness that needs to be addressed by the region’s economies. Moreover, the MENA region 
has for too long pursued a growth strategy reliant essentially on capital accumulation as engine 
of growth.   
Table10 
 Trade in technological products in MENA countries 
 
Hi-tech exports as % of total 
manufactured exports 2006 
Algeria 1 
Bahrain 2 
Comoros  
Djibouti  
Egypt 0.6 
Jordan 5.2 
Kuwait 1 
Lebanon 2.4 
Libya  
Mauritania  
Morocco 10.1 
Oman 2.2 
Qatar 1.2 
SA 1.3 
Sudan  
Syrian  1 
Tunisia 4.9 
UAE 10.2 
Yemen  
Source: Knowledge Assessment Methodology Data Base, World Bank (2008) 
However, high integration in the world economy, per se, is not the source of vulnerability. The 
major problem of the region is its high concentration of exports with a low comparative 
advantage, and its limited local market size combined with a low level of regional integration. 
The main exports of the region are raw materials and the technological content of its exports is 
modest, which reduces their competitiveness and bargaining power. Indeed, the share of hi-tech 
exports in total manufactured exports in 2005 was, on average, 3.3 per cent. Morocco and EAU 
recorded the highest level of hi-tech exports at 10 per cent and Egypt the lowest level at 0.6 per 
cent (table 10); for comparison, it should be mentioned that the corresponding share in 
Malaysia, for example, is 54.7 per cent (World Bank, 2009).  
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 In addition, the MENA region has lagged behind in terms of regional integration. Indeed, 
despite the favourable conditions of some of the region’s countries and the comparative 
advantage of geographic proximity to other MENA nations, intra-regional trade is still very 
low, less than 14 per cent  (13 per cent of exports or the equivalent of US$65 billion, imports 15 
per cent, or US$62 billion). Bahrain, Oman and Yemen are exceptions as they import more than 
30 per cent of their needs from the region. The poor results are due to the fact that current 
integration projects are driven by political considerations instead of a natural process of 
integration fostered by the market for which geographic proximity is an essential factor.  
The concentration of trade and poor regional integration, in conjunction with the paucity of 
effective mechanisms of coordination and cooperation, make the MENA region relatively 
vulnerable. Indeed, regional cooperation to overcome the crisis through greater intra-regional 
trade and funds to support the most affected countries could reduce its consequences and 
shorten the time needed for recovery. Consequently, a regional strategy to deal with internal as 
well as external shocks is not going to be easy.  
Human and institutional deficiencies  
To a large degree, the ability of any economy to continue to function in the face of unexpected 
events depends on the institutional structure and the operational systems in place, and the 
resilience of these. Moreover, it is widely accepted that social relations and institutions 
contribute to the effective functioning of the economic system. The role of institutions and good 
governance in promoting economic growth is confirmed by many recent works (see Rodrik, 
Subramanina and Trebbi, 2002; Easterly and Levine, 1997). For instance, the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2009-2010, considers important pillars of economic development to be 
the institutional environment and solid institutions that play a crucial role during economic 
crisis.  
Weak governance and corruption are the main bottlenecks handicapping the human and 
institutional development of the region. Familialism is still important in the MENA region, and 
favours and kin reciprocities often govern people’s interaction (Abu-Laban & Abu-Laban , 
1987).  
24
Table 11 
 Human and Institutional development in MENA countries 
 
Life 
expectancy 
 at birth, 
females 
(2000-2005) 
Literacy 
rate, all 
adults  
(2007) 
Corruption 
perceptions 
index*** 
 
(Transparency 
International) 
(2006) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index†††  
(2007) 
Political 
Stability  
and 
Absence of 
Violence 
Index‡‡‡  
(2007) 
Algeria 72.2 75.4 3.1 -0.52 -1.18 
Bahrain 76.5 88.8 5.7 0.41 -0.28 
Comoros 65.1 75.1  -1.8 -0.4 
Djibouti 54.9   -0.98 -0.05 
Egypt 72 66.4 3.3   -0.44   -0.77 
Jordan 73.1 91 5.3 0.27 -0.29 
Kuwait  79.2 94.5 4.8 0.2 0.4 
Lebanon 73.2 89.6 3.6 -0.61 -2.09 
Libya 75.7 86.8 2.7 -1.07 0.47 
Mauritania 64 55.8 3.1 -0.68 -0.33 
Morocco 71.8 55.6 3.2 -0.07 -0.52 
Oman 75.9 84.4 5.4 0.38 0.76 
Qatar 75.3 93.1 6 0.06 0.81 
Saudi 
Arabia 74 85 3.3 -0.18 -0.59 
Sudan 57.8 60.9 2 -1.18 -2.3 
Syria  74.9 83.1 2.9 -0.88 -0.61 
Tunisia 75.1 77.7 4.6 0.46 0.1 
UA E 80.5 90 6.2 0.86 0.76 
Yemen 61.8 58.9 2.6 -1.02 -1.48 
Source: World Resources Institute.  
 
As is shown in table 8, most MENA countries suffer from bad governance and political 
instability. Indeed, with a few exceptions, the region is below the world level in terms of 
government effectiveness and political stability. Moreover, most MENA countries rank poorly 
in terms of corruption, and TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index consistently ranks these nations 
below the world median.  
                                                 
*** Units, 10=least corrupt, 0=most corrupt 
††† Units: -2.5 worst governance, 0 average, 2.5 best governance 
‡‡‡ Units: -2.5 worst governance, 0 average, 2.5 best governance 
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Low social capital, security and social tensions, conflicts, deteriorated business environment, 
due to excessive public intervention, and low quality of human capital are additional 
bottlenecks handicapping development and stability in the region.  
In terms of human development, many of the region’s nations have achieved higher levels than 
other developing countries, as indicated by the relatively higher life expectancy for females and 
literacy rates. However, the recent gains in human development are fragile, and are not built on 
long-run government policies (Arab NGO network for Development, 2009). Indeed, the 
provision of public and social services depends on volatile oil revenues. Moreover, in poorer 
countries of the region the lower life expectancy for females compared to the world average (68 
years) reflects a very precarious situation.  
In the absence of robust safety networks and well-developed social policies, the number of 
vulnerable regions and populations may grow sharply, triggering social and political 
instabilities. Even for the richer countries having adequate financial resources to dampen 
economic and social impacts of an eventual crisis, the cost will be relatively high due to the 
lack of good governance. Damage caused by potential crises could be contained if these 
countries had well-designed institutions. Because of the lack of financial resources and 
inefficient institutions as well as the lack of effective social policies, the poorer MENA 
countries may be faced with social tensions. 
4. Concluding remarks and policy recommendations  
The MENA region finds itself at a crossroad, faced with new opportunities but also challenged 
by real social and economic debacles. Development programmes implemented by the different 
states have failed to deliver significant results, and essential reforms are needed if these are to 
remain viable in the global economy.  
Diversification of the economy continues to be a major challenge for the region in general. 
Many experts call for urgent action to address the main causes of economic vulnerability in the 
region and to enhance its resilience to external shocks. Moreover, it becomes vital that MENA 
countries improve the overall quality of governance and raise their economic competitiveness. 
Improvements to macroeconomic management as well as institutional reforms are essential to 
enhance efficiency and facilitate the absorption of new technology.  
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It is clear that the economic performance of the region during past centuries was not simply a 
coincidence but the result of good management of existing capacities combined with the 
willingness to seize opportunities offered by the favourable global environment. 
In short, the ‘golden age’ of the region during the period from the 7th century to the late 13th 
century can be explained by factors such as: 
• First, the region succeeded in promoting a dynamic economy through control of much 
of worldwide trade and the free movement of goods, people and capital. The mass of 
wealth generated through large-scale trade provided the financial resources needed for 
developing the necessary administration, agriculture and industry.  
• Second, the strong central power and well-developed administrative system provided an 
appropriate environment for the smooth conduct of economic activities. Free market 
system, combined with a strong, stable monetary system, led to economic and social 
prosperity in the region.  
• Third, with new technology and innovative planting and irrigation methods, the 
agricultural revolution provided the backbone of the region’s economic development. 
Quantitative and qualitative advancement in agricultural production also promoted the 
development of some basic industries like the sugar and paper industries. 
The main conclusion of this paper is the fact that economic and social deficiencies in the 
MENA region are currently a matter of choice, not its irrevocable destiny. In other words, the 
region’s current, poor economic performance is not an historical fatality but the result of bad 
policy options made after the end of colonization and the emergence of the modern states. 
Indeed, despite a wide range of economic reforms having been adopted since the 1970s and late 
1980s, the region’s economic frameworks remain fragile and dependent on the economic 
conditions of the industrial countries.  
From our analysis, we can conclude that the development process in the region has already 
reached its limit and can no longer meet the region's needs in terms of development and 
stability. A new development strategy based on the knowledge economy has become more than 
urgent in order to establish the foundation for sustained development.  
Indeed, despite 35 years of active effort and vast amounts of money, economic achievements 
have fallen far short of the population’s aspirations; the region remains extremely fragile and 
dependent on the economic conditions and policies of the industrial countries. Even if important 
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foreign exchange reserves have helped certain countries within the region to overcome many 
economic crises, the financial cost of support has been relatively high. Moreover, it appears that 
the fragility of the region could worsen in the future, if account is taken of the risk of greater 
fluctuations in food and oil prices. The likely depletion of the region’s water resources, 
combined with severe climate changes, will introduce greater challenges.  
Despite the apparent heterogeneity of MENA, available financial and human resources are 
important assets that could, with better management, establish the foundation for sustained 
development throughout the region. Even if regional integration currently appears to be difficult 
to achieve, it remains the only option for the region. Geographic proximity may play a key role 
in promoting economic integration and improving intra-regional trade and investment.  
However, geographic proximity per se cannot influence trade among neighbouring countries if 
these are underdeveloped and lack trade potential. Geographic proximity can give an additional 
stimulus to trade only if the preconditions for dynamic growth exist. Consequently, to improve 
intra-regional trade among the MENA countries, a dynamic mechanism needs to be envisaged. 
The emergence of virtuous trade circle among the MENA states needs that leader countries be 
developed first before attempts at regional integration are made, and the leader would then be 
utilized by neighbouring nations as a vehicle (pivot country) or an engine for industrialization 
and development. Intraregional trade could be used by the lead countries to supplement their 
international trade in order to overcome the limited size of local markets, thus remedying the 
scarcity of resources, enhancing production efficiencies by developing economies of scale and 
achieving higher production capacities as a result of the better allocation of domestic resources. 
Regional trade can be used by other countries to boost competition in the domestic market and 
improving terms of trade due to cheaper imports.  
In the final analysis, the MENA countries should coordinate their efforts and develop a regional 
plan for agricultural and industrial investment, and adopt regional projects for improving 
education and training. Strong, modern institutions could represent a safeguard against future 
crises as well as develop the capacities of the region to absorb external shocks. Better 
governance and greater freedom are essential to address the various sources of vulnerability and 
to increase the resilience of the region. The potential social costs that the region could support 
justify the need to invest more effort in this direction. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: Main characteristics by country 
 
 
 
Food 
imports 
(%imports) 
Trade  
(% of 
GDP) 
Industry
 (% of 
GDP) 
Fuel 
exports 
(%exports)
Domestic 
credit  
 (% of 
GDP) 
Remittances 
(%GDP) 
External 
Debt  
(%GNI) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(PPP) 
First Group 
Algeria 20.91 65.17 57.66 97.95 20.39  6736
Bahrain 7.30 38.29  74.65 59.19  25329
Kuwait 16.39 71.85 53.34 93.44 74.96  37818
Oman 10.97 94.60 54.48 85.05 35.46  19064
Qatar 7.70 129.88  89.83 37.85  64262
Saudi 
Arabia 14.54 157.57 53.09 89.81 54.41
 20357
Libya 16.91 79.11   2.33  12396
UAE 33.26 47.58 11.86 67.61 11.54  45896
Second Group  
Egypt 15.52 66.72 27.73 0.38 97.04 4.17 30.85 4504 
Jordan 17.00 88.49 23.74 0.26 184.06 21.30 70.53 4095 
Lebanon 17.79 98.66 32.38  -3.77 19.48 92.89 9108 
Morocco 12.58 61.15 24.66 77.37 12.71 7.66 38.00 3447 
Syrian 8.71 93.25 28.89 11.55 72.22 2.16 118.48 3939 
Tunisia 7.21 147.44 54.26 67.61 50.57 4.81 68.29 6159 
Third Group  
Comoros  51.67 16.21  28.52 3.99 90.99 1110 
Djibouti 21.50 60.18 35.61 45.15 103.23 3.69 52.28 1824 
Mauritania 11.01 107.65 27.89 3.91 77.94 0.14 145.94 1668 
Sudan 16.60 96.07 34.13 67.59 30.90 5.17 93.39 1621 
Yemen 25.51 78.25 42.15 94.14 5.77 10.16 45.71 2138 
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Table A 2: Share of Agricultural labor force 
 
Share of 
Agricultural labor 
force in total labor 
force 
Share of female in 
agricultural labor 
force 
Algeria 23.3 52.2 
Bahrain   
Comoros 71.9 50.9 
Djibouti 76.9 48.7 
Egypt 30.7 48.4 
Jordan 10.3 69.7 
Kuwait 1.1 1 
Lebanon 2.8 39 
Libya 4.6 66.3 
Mauritania 51.6 51.7 
Morocco 33.5 85.2 
Oman   
Qatar   
Saudi Arabia 7.5 8.2 
Sudan 57.4 38.2 
Syria 26.1 65 
Tunisia 23.1 41.8 
United Arab 
Emirates 4.1  
Yemen 46.4 44.1 
                             Source: FAO (2008) 
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